How compliant are developing countries with their TRIPS obligations? by Hamdan-Livramento, Intan M.
  
 
 
 
 
HAMDAN-LIVRAMENTO, INTAN M. 
 
How compliant are developing countries with their TRIPS 
obligations? 
 
 
Chaire en Economie et Management de l’Innovation (CEMI) 
January 2009 
CEMI-WORKINGPAPER-2009-001 
Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to build an IPR index based on the World Trade Organization's Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to study the impact of the Agreement for 53 developing 
countries. I consult national IPR legislations, various IPR-specific reports, and legal experts and 
practitioners, whenever possible, to construct the index. Analysis of the data shows three implementation 
trends. Firstly, almost all developing countries take advantage of the transition period clause of the 
Agreement (Art. 65), and in some cases exceed the TRIPS implementation deadline for developing 
countries, 2000. Secondly, implementation efforts of developing countries vary, and not necessarily 
because of their income levels. Lastly, countries in regional trade agreements (RTAs) that include IPR 
obligations tend to comply with TRIPS earlier than the rest. The results confirm that the TRIPS agreement 
leads to a convergence of global IPR protection across countries. It also makes the case that the 
Agreement's implementation is an external factor, not entirely influenced by the country's level of 
economic development. This index can be used as a natural experiment to understand how IPR 
influences economic activities and behaviors. 
Keywords: intellectual property rights, developing countries 
 
JEL classification: O34, K33, C43 
EPFL CDM   Odyssea   Station 5   CH - 1015 Lausanne   Switzerland   Tel: + 41 21 693 0036   Fax: +41 21 693 0020   http://cdm.epfl.ch 
How compliant are developing countries with their
TRIPS obligations?
Intan M. Hamdan-Livramento∗†
30th January 2009
(this version)
Abstract
This paper attempts to build an IPR index based on the World Trade Organization’s
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to study the impact of the
Agreement for 53 developing countries. I consult national IPR legislations, various IPR-
specific reports, and legal experts and practitioners, whenever possible, to construct the
index. Analysis of the data shows three implementation trends. Firstly, almost all developing
countries take advantage of the transition period clause of the Agreement (Art. 65), and
in some cases exceed the TRIPS implementation deadline for developing countries, 2000.
Secondly, implementation efforts of developing countries vary, and not necessarily because
of their income levels. Lastly, countries in regional trade agreements (RTAs) that include
IPR obligations tend to comply with TRIPS earlier than the rest. The results confirm that
the TRIPS agreement leads to a convergence of global IPR protection across countries. It
also makes the case that the Agreement’s implementation is an external factor, not entirely
influenced by the country’s level of economic development. This index can be used as a
natural experiment to understand how IPR influences economic activities and behaviors.
Keywords: intellectual property rights, developing countries
JEL classification: 034, K33, C43
∗PhD Candidate at the EPFL-CDM-CEMI, Lausanne, Switzerland. Contact information: E´cole Poly-
technique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne (EPFL), CDM-CEMI, Odyssea Station 5, CH–1015, Lausanne. E-mail: in-
tan.hamdan@epfl.ch; office tel. #: +(41) 21 693 0037.
†I would like to thank participants of EPIP 2008 in Bern, Switzerland for their comments and feedback. I am
indebted to Josefita Pardo de Leon, Fernando Pierola, and Marisa Goldstein for their legal help and comments;
Julio Raffo for his insights on the “Scandanavian flag”. My gratitude goes out to Dominique Foray, Marc Gruber,
Will Meredith and Mosahid Khan for their advice, insightful discussion and feedback on earlier versions of this
paper. All errors remain my own.
1
1 Introduction
Arrow (1962) underscores the importance of having an incentive mechanism that would encour-
age innovative activities, one of which is the government sanctioned monopoly rights of intellec-
tual property rights (IPR) protection. He argues that market failure of knowledge production
justifies the institutionalization of such mechanism and encourages activities that generate pos-
itive spillover effects. The demandeurs of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights agreement (TRIPS, or the Agreement) during the Uruguay Round of negotiations have
contended that the lack of IPR protection in some countries hinder the free flow of goods and
services worldwide, and so have pushed for global IPR protection. However research on exam-
ining the relevance of having IPR protection produce inconclusive results. Evidences compile
on how IPR protection, in particular the patent system, impacts R&D (Varsakelis, 2001; Mans-
field, 1994) , trade (Smith, 1999; Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; Ferrantino, 1993), foreign direct
investments (Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004; Lee and Mansfield, 1996; Mansfield, 1994) and wel-
fare (Falvey, Foster, and Greenaway, 2006; Thompson and Rushing, 1999; Deardoff, 1992; Rapp
and Rozek, 1990). The results of these studies show mixed assessments on the impact of IPR
protection in developing countries. In sum, researchers are unable to clearly establish causal
relationship between IPR systems and economic development (Granstrand, 1999).
The advent of TRIPS and the near-universal influence of this global IPR system neces-
sitates careful scrutiny of this Agreement on developing countries’ economic activities. This
paper builds a TRIPS-compliant index to serve this purpose by tracking developing countries’
compliance with this multilateral agreement. I examine the legislations, various IPR-specific
reports and consult practitioners and legal experts, wherever possible, to achieve this goal. My
research focuses on original member countries of to the World Trade Organization (WTO) who
have acceded in the year 1995, and examines how the IPR regimes in these countries changes
in-line with their TRIPS obligations.
Analysis of the data shows three implementation trends. Firstly, almost all developing
countries take advantage of the transition periods clause of the Agreement (Art. 65), and in
some cases exceed the TRIPS implementation deadline for developing countries, 2000. Secondly,
implementation efforts of developing countries vary, and not necessarily because of their income
levels. Lastly, countries in regional trade agreements (RTAs) that include IPR obligations tend
to comply with TRIPS earlier than the rest. The results confirm that the TRIPS agreement
leads to a convergence of global IPR protection across countries. It also makes the case that
the Agreement’s implementation is an external factor, not entirely influenced by the country’s
level of economic development.
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The lack of endogenous attribution of IPR level to economic development and convergence
of global IPR across countries lead to the possibility of using this index as a natural experiment
to understand how IPR influences economic activities and behaviors.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of available
IPR indexes and argues in favor of a new TRIPS-compliant index. Section 3 describes how
implementation of the TRIPS agreement changes the global IPR landscape. Section 4 explains
how the index is constructed and discusses some drawbacks of the index. The penultimate
section analyzes the results of the data collected on various IPR legislations and the final
section concludes with a brief discussion.
2 IPR quantification
Quantification of IPR systems through an index is an imperfect method to capture the vari-
ances in IPR legislations across countries. However these indexes provide means to investigating
whether and to what extent IPR regimes explain variations in economic activities across coun-
tries.
This section underlines the need for a TRIPS-specific IPR index and discusses how currently
available IPR indexes are unsatisfactory to use in studying the impact of TRIPS implementation
on economic activities. I also provide an overview of some IPR indexes in detail as a few of
them are used to construct the new TRIPS-compliant index in Section 4.
2.1 Need for TRIPS index
Most of the available IPR indexes are not TRIPS specific and thus fall short of my expectation
to properly examine the effect of the Agreement’s implementation on economic activities. The
following paragraphs elaborate the reasons why.
TRIPS identifies seven categories of IPR and outlines the respective scopes and depths of
protection, while the available indexes mainly focus on patent protection. If the purpose of a
study is to examine the impact of IPR protection on pharmaceutical R&D, or on licensing of
patented products of process, then using a TRIPS updated patent index is sufficient. How-
ever, focusing on patent protection ignores other IPR categories that could influence innovative
activities in various sectors of the economy. For example, in most developing countries com-
puter software is protected as literary works under copyright of TRIPS and not necessarily
under patent, while circuit board is covered by layout designs of integrated circuits.1 Further-
1In some countries, computer software and/or layout designs of integrated circuits may be patentable. How-
ever, this has not been the case for the WTO member countries studied here.
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more, the services sector produces intellectual creations that usually fall outside the scope of
patentability. A case in point, trademark and geographical indication protect the brand of the
goods produced while copyrights protects expressions of ideas. In addition, protection of trade
secrets as an IPR may be a significant factor in explaining certain types of economic activities,
in concordance with the results from the infamous the Yale survey (Cohen, Nelson, and et.
al, 2000). Therefore current emphasis on capturing patent strength relevant for activities of
patent-specific industries such as pharmaceutical and chemical industries are at the expense of
industries that do not rely on patent for protection of their intellectual property, limiting the
scope of research to patentable economic activities.
The implementation of the seven IPR categories identified by TRIPS is usually staggered
across different years. Use of the transition periods, legislative procedures, budget, expertise
and other constraints influence the implementation times of any one of the IPR types. Thus,
indexes that attempt to capture TRIPS implementation effort by using WTO membership
as proxy, disregarding the transition periods given to developing countries, would incorrectly
identify the date when the Agreement takes full effect. This is similarly applicable to indexes
that do take into consideration the transition periods accorded by the TRIPS agreement as they
may overestimate the implementation efforts of the countries if they use the transition deadline
dates rather than examining the national legislations themselves. Case in point, countries in
this study are WTO members since 1995 and yet most of them only begin to fully comply with
their TRIPS provisions from the year 2000 onwards.2 However, there are some countries that
are not fully compliant with their obligations, missing the year 2000 mark. Jamaica is a prime
example of member countries that have not managed to reach full TRIPS compliance by the
deadline imposed.
No international IPR agreement is as enforceable as the TRIPS agreement. The Paris and
Berne Conventions set the standards for IPR protection worldwide. However they are considered
weak because of the lack of proper enforcement of these agreements at the international level.
Members of the TRIPS agreement, on the other hand, have recourse to the WTO’s effective
dispute settlement proceedings, thus allowing any one member to ensure that another member
is fully compliant with its TRIPS obligations. In the dispute case India—Mailbox, the United
States complained that India had not established the mailbox filing system from the 1st January
1996, inconsistent with its obligations under Art. 70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIPS agreement (WTO,
1997).3 The appellate body found in favor of the United States and required India to enact the
2The year 2000 is the TRIPS implementation deadline established by the Agreement for most developing
countries.
3Under the mailbox system, a mechanism is set up to allow for the filing of patent applications of pharmaceu-
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mailbox filing system retroactively. Therefore, IPR indexes that use membership to pre-TRIPS
international IPR agreements as proxy IPR systems should be used with caution; particularly
because the implementation and the enforceability of the international IPR agreements may
differ significantly from country to country. Section 3 elaborates on this further.
Diverse coverage of IPR categories, bindingness of the Agreement and staggered implemen-
tation dates of the TRIPS agreement by developing countries allow for a natural experiment,
investigating how this global minimum IPR standard may affect economic activities in these
countries. Thus, a new TRIPS-specific index is required to properly study whether this inter-
national agreement affects local economic activities in developing countries.
2.2 Available IPR indexes
Most available IPR indexes are built through a set of criteria that establishes an ideal or adequate
IPR legal system. Based on how these criteria are satisfied, I classify the indexes according to
three types: legislation- and survey-based approaches, and combination of the two. When the
criteria are satisfied via examination of the country’s rules and regulations, I refer to them as
legislation-based, while those that require the responses of experts are categorized as survey-
based. Each of these approaches, on its own, has its weaknesses. The legislation-based approach
is criticized for overestimating the level of protection accorded because it does not take into
consideration the actual enforcement of those rights.4 On the other hand, the survey-based
approach can be subjective, relying on the way the questions are posed and possibly reflecting
some “ideological tendencies” as mentioned by Kauffman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004). Using
a combination of the two approaches of building an index through examination of countries’
IPR legislations and interacting with expert assessment of actual enforcement of the IPR law
would rectify the weaknesses in either one of the approaches, legislation- and survey-based.
Gadbaw and Richards (1988) constructs the first legislation-based patent index, which is
extended by Rapp and Rozek (1990). This type of index construction notes whether a country’s
IPR legislation is in conformity with the minimum standards of IPR as proposed by the U.S.
tical or agrochemical products. The patent application would be reviewed from the date on which patenting in
the field of pharmaceutical and agrochemical products are allowed. Once an application is subject to the mailbox
application and it has obtained marketing approval then that product will be granted EMR for five years, a right
that is similar to patent protection (Watal, 2001).
4I use the term “actual enforcement” to refer to the country’s practice of protecting their IPR rules. For
example, a country may have strong IPR legislation but lack the budget or political will to ensure that its IPR is
fully protected. Here, I refer to means that the government can fully enforce, e.g. custom control of pirated goods.
Other means of enforcement, such as the injured party taking the possible violator to court is not considered
here; this is a case between private parties and thus outside government control.
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Chamber of Commerce Intellectual Property Task Force (1987), ranging from 0 (absence of
IPR protection) to 5 (full compliance with the minimum standards). Rather than focusing
on national legislations, Ferrantino (1993) builds an index using membership in WIPO basic
conventions as an input measure of IPR strength for 75 countries. Later, Ginarte and Park
(1997) produces the most widely used IPR-index to date, basing their index on collection of both
national patent legislations and membership to international IPR conventions. The index covers
large number of countries over the period 1960 — 1990 and allows for variations in cross-country
patent laws, making it desirable for cross-country studies (Maskus, 2000). Criteria to measure
the strength of a country’s patent regime are: (i) membership in international treaties, (ii)
extent of patent coverage, (iii) restrictions on patent rights, (iv) enforcement and (v) duration
of the patent protection. In 2008, Park (2008) updates the Ginarte-Park index to include TRIPS
membership and extends its country and year coverage. Lastly, Park and Lippoldt (2007) uses
two indexes, in addition to the patent index by Park (2008), on copyright and trademark to
investigate the economic impact of these IPR types. These two IPR categories of copyright
and trademark follow similar set of rules as those set in Ginarte and Park (1997) such that
they cover issues related to coverage, usage, enforcement and membership to international IPR
treaties but are specific to copyrights and trademark respectively.
Lee and Mansfield (1996) conducts the first survey-based IPR index. The survey asks 100
major U.S. multinational firms how a country’s IPR regime affects its investment strategy
in the host country, i.e. transfer of technology to wholly owned subsidiaries, investment in
joint ventures with local partners or licensing of technology, and averages the responses for
14 developing countries. Seyoum (1996) builds a similar survey-based index but bases his
questionnaire on the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (1987) guidelines, and later sends them to
IPR experts or practitioners in 27 countries. These indexes were oftentimes for a specific and
limited time period, making it difficult to asses the dynamic impact of IPR protection. The
ongoing surveys on the strength of IPR across different countries by the World Economic Forum
(WEF) and the IMD correct this time period problem. The WEF questionnaire poses to market
participants of both developing and developed countries a question on the strength of IPR
protection in their respective countries. It asks, “Intellectual property protection in your country
is: (1=weak or non-existent, 7=equal to the world’s most stringent)” to professionals residing
in those countries. The result of the survey is published in their annual Global Competitiveness
Report. The IMD questionnaire, on the other hand, queries whether IPR “are adequately
enforced” to senior business leaders in those respective countries, ranging from 1 to 10 with
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10 being the highest achievable score.5 These survey-based indexes capture the perceived IPR
strengths of countries but are highly subjective to the questions posed and the experts selected.
The problems associated with the legislation- and survey-based indexes may be addressed
by using the two approaches together, as Kondo (1995), Sherwood (1997), Ostergard (2000)
and Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) have done. Kondo builds his index on a similar criteria as
Ginarte and Park (1997) but weights each subcomponent of the patent regime using results
from market practitioners’ input on the enforcement level. Sherwood (1997) probably offers
the most extensive coverage in determining the strength of nations’ IPR regime by examining
issues of copyright, patents, trademarks, trade secrets, life forms in addition to enforceabil-
ity, administration, public commitment and international treaties signed of the IPR regime.
However, his IPR index only covers 18 developing countries and the weights assigned to the
components of IPR regime are based primarily on his personal knowledge and personal inter-
views with professionals from those countries. Ostergard (2000) examines the legislations of
patent, copyright and trademark laws using the US Chamber of Commerce’s guidelines and
supplements this legislative information with enforcement assessment from the US State De-
partment’s Country Reports on Economic and Trade Practices. Smarzynska Javorcik (2004)
builds on the Ginarte and Park (1997) index but adds the element of enforcement by account-
ing for countries that have been flagged by the United States’ Special 301 as countries that have
weak IPR regimes. Lastly, Lesser (2002) constructs an index using secondary data to build a
TRIPS compliant patent-specific index, and adds an actual enforcement component captured
by the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). He then runs factor
analysis to determine the importance of each criterion and weighs each criterion in his construc-
tion of the IPR index by the aggregate factor values, in addition to cross-referencing them with
responses from a survey sent to patent attorneys and licensing executives of agricultural and
pharmaceutical firms in the United States and Europe.
Table 1 summarizes the three approaches to constructing IPR indexes. It highlights the
different IPR categories captured by the indexes, the international agreements under consider-
ation, whether the indexes have an actual enforcement component, country and years coverage,
update frequency and the index sources. The legislation type indexes, Park (2008) and Park
and Lippoldt (2007), are mainly built on the countries’ IPR rules and regulations.6 The survey
type indexes, Lee and Mansfield (1996) and Seyoum (1996), emphasize the expert opinions over
5A simple Pearson pairwise correlation shows that the IMD and WEF survey results are strongly correlated.
6Park and Lippoldt (2007) includes an actual enforcement component,however this enforcement component
is used as a separate explanatory variable from the IPR indexes.Thus, I consider the indexes discussed in this
paper as only legislation-based.
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the countries’ legislations. And lastly, the indexes that include both legislation- and survey-
approaches, Ostergard (2000) and Lesser (2002) utilize both the countries’ legislations and
actual enforcement to construct indexes that capture both the legal rules and the enforcement
of those rules.
The table shows how the IPR indexes available today fall short of capturing IPR legislative
changes due to the TRIPS agreement. The indexes here neither cover all seven IPR categories
nor the different time periods of implementation for each of the IPR types. Park and Lippoldt
(2007) and Lesser (2002) come close to capturing TRIPS elements in their indexes. However
Park and Lippoldt (2007) falls short of being TRIPS-compliant mainly because it covers three
of the seven IPR categories set by TRIPS and double-counts the importance of international
treaties. The TRIPS agreement references both the Paris and Berne convention and incorporates
main elements of those treaties. Therefore tracking a country’s membership of both the Paris
and Berne convention in addition to the TRIPS agreement is redundant. Lesser (2002) on
the other hand, focuses solely on the implementation of patents at the expense of other IPR
categories for the year 1998, making it difficult to study the dynamic impact of this Agreement.
Aside from the coverage of IPR categories, the time period coverage in the cases of Park (2008)
and Park and Lippoldt (2007) are relatively comprehensive. However their data is updated
every 5 years, disregarding the possibility that most of the legislative changes may occur within
those years, especially within the years 1995 — 2000.
Other attempts at capturing TRIPS are undertaken by Musungu and Oh (2006), and Thorpe
(2002). Both papers aim to study the use of TRIPS flexibility by developing country members.
Musungu and Oh (2006)’s paper focuses on public health issue and thus considers patent-related
information only. Thorpe (2002)’s research is more exhaustive in that he surveys different coun-
tries in different regions and analyzes the patent, copyright and related rights, and undisclosed
information. Unfortunately these study papers only examine the current legislations in force, not
distinguishing between legislations that are TRIPS-compliant with those that are not, exclude
the exact date of TRIPS-compliant legislations implementation, and omit other IPR categories
in their studies.
A useful TRIPS index should capture the seven IPR categories as the Agreement states and
note the different implementation time periods per IPR category over several years, to allow
for a dynamic assessment of the Agreement’s influence. In Section 4.1 I build a TRIPS-specific
IPR index that attempts to address these concerns. But prior to building the index I detail how
TRIPS differs from previous international IPR agreements to emphasize how TRIPS changes
the global IPR landscape in the following section.
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3 Change in global IPR landscape
TRIPS agreement changes the global IPR landscape, harmonizing and setting the minimum
level of protection for intangible goods and services. It identifies seven IPR categories: (i) copy-
rights and related rights, (ii) trademark; (iii) geographical indications; (iv) industrial designs,
(v) layout designs of integrated circuits, (vi) patents, and (vii) undisclosed information, above
and beyond the pre-TRIPS international IPR conventions. For each of these categories, the
WTO principles of most-favored nation (MFN) and national treatment basis are applicable,
unlike when reciprocity was a principle for extending IPR protection to foreigners.13 TRIPS’
enforceability at the multilateral level due to the effective dispute settlement mechanism of
the WTO presents a credible threat for countries to comply with the obligations (Watal, 2001;
Gervais, 2003). Therefore, the harmonized scope of IPR protection and its enforceability would
lead toward convergence of IPR regimes across developing countries. Furthermore, this con-
vergence should be relatively independent of the respective countries’ economic development
because implementation deadlines imposed.
3.1 Pre-TRIPS
National IPR landscape prior to the TRIPS agreement seemed more flexible, with countries
implementing the IPR provisions when it was in their national interest. Prior to the TRIPS,
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan had enforced “soft” IPR regimes, enabling
themselves to adopt, adapt and assimilate technologies from developed nations (Kumar, 2002).
Some of the other developing countries were more inclined to copy the IPR systems of their
former colonial rulers than build a system suitable for their economic conditions. For example,
South Africa, Kenya, Zambia, Namibia, Swaziland and Morocco had a few TRIPS compliant
legislations before the WTO agreement was signed in 1995. However, enforcement of these IPR
legislations were oftentimes weak because of limited resources and/or lack of political will. As
a consequence there was a noticeable and significant relationship between the extent of IPR
protection and level of economic development, whereby higher income countries provided more
IPR protection than lower income countries (Evenson and Westphal, 1997). The World Bank
(2001) report concurs with (Evenson and Westphal, 1997) and adds that IPR regimes also tend
to be stronger when the country has high innovation capacities.14
13MFN and national treatment are principles of the WTO trading system. Simply put, MFN rule obliges each
member country to treat every one of its trading partner as its closest partner, while national treatment policy
requires that every foreign trader should be treated like a local one.
14The term “innovation capacities” refers to the country’s ability to produce innovation, usually proxied by
the proportion of R&D per domestic production, ratio of science and engineers of the country’s labor population,
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Patent protection is an area of IPR where the international agreement governing industrial
policy the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention) ac-
cords considerable policy room for developing countries to apply the rules according to their
country’s level of economic development, or to meet specific industrial policy. India used to
protect process and not product patenting of pharmaceutical products, thus creating a legal
condition for local pharmaceutical companies to produce generic versions of branded drugs.
Surveying the IPR regimes in a selected number of countries, a WIPO submitted document to
the WTO show that only three of the 42 developing countries studied had patent protection for
the duration of 20 years, notably South Africa, Zimbabwe and Nigeria (WIPO, 1988). In addi-
tion, exclusion of patent protection in areas such as life forms, pharmaceutical and agriculture
chemical products, and computer programs were norm, as they depended on each country’s
perception of patentability. TRIPS agreement has broadened the scope of protection conferred
to patented inventions by: (i) protecting process and products; (ii) applying this to all techno-
logical fields; and (iii) setting a minimum duration of patent protection. However, strengthening
patent protection is not the only change that TRIPS has imposed on developing countries.
The following subsection 3.2 expounds on the main differences between TRIPS and other
international IPR conventions, elucidating on how the global IPR landscape changes under this
Agreement.
3.2 Modification in IPR protection
Main multilateral IPR agreements and the practices during the negotiations of the Uruguay
Round shapes the language and rights of members of the TRIPS agreement. These agreements
were the Paris Convention governing industrial property and trademark, Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention)and Rome Convention for
the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (Rome
Convention) on copyrights and related rights. A then-recent international agreement on inte-
grated circuits, the Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuit
(Washington Treaty or the IPIC treaty), is included also in the TRIPS text. TRIPS merges
the scope and breath of protection outlined in these agreements as well as the practices related
to the implementation of these conventions and formalizes them under one umbrella. Thus
obligating members of the WTO to comply with relevant provisions of these agreements, even
if they were not formerly signatories to the agreements aforementioned. The new obligations
imposed by TRIPS narrows the policy room for many developing countries to tailor their IPR
and so on.
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systems according to their development needs.
3.2.1 Patents
Paris Convention extends patent protection to both product and process in all fields of technol-
ogy. Furthermore, it allows member countries to determine their own standards of protection
in regards to duration of protection, patentable subject matters and exceptions to patent rights
as long as the principles of national treatment is consistently applied. TRIPS incorporates
the substantive elements of Paris Convention on patent protection but curtails the flexibility
accorded. All WTO members have to ensure that the duration of patent protection is set at
20 years from date of patent application filing, instances in which suspension of the protec-
tion could be invoked are limited, exceptions to subject matters excludable from patenting are
clearly defined, and patentees rights are extended to include associated rights of offering for sale
or importing.
In general TRIPS’ provision on patent protection is applicable to both product and process
inventions for all technological fields except for certain subject matters that are considered public
goods, biologically occurring products and processes of plants or animals, and any methods for
treatment of human or animals. Plant varieties are protected either under patent or by an
effective sui generis legislation. Five years from the date of TRIPS enforcement deadline, 1st
January 2000, is given to developing countries that have not provided patent protection in
any area of technology prior to the general enforcement date of the Agreement, 1st January
1996.15 Specifically, developing countries that have not provided protection for pharmaceutical
and/or agricultural chemical products prior to 1st January 1995 are required to set up a mailbox
system of patent application and provide exclusive marketing rights (EMR) from the 1st January
1996 (TRIPS Art. 70.8).16 Failure to comply with this provision implies non-compliance with
the agreement even when developing countries are accorded transition periods to phase in the
TRIPS-compliant IPR regime (see WTO (1997)’s India—Mailbox dispute).
3.2.2 Undisclosed information
Undisclosed information was not formally considered a category of IPR protection until the
TRIPS agreement.17 It was oftentimes protected by general civil law or tort, contract and/or
15For LDCs this implementation period is extended to 1st January 2016 because of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration.
16Under the mailbox filing system rule, WTO members that did not allow for patenting of pharmaceutical
and/or agricultural chemical products previously had to establish a filing system for these products.
17Also referred to as “trade secrets”, “confidential information” and the like in many national laws. The term
“undisclosed information” was purposely chosen by negotiating parties of the Uruguay Round to avoid referring
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criminal laws. At the international level reference to its protection was mandated by Art. 10bis
of the Paris Convention particularly vis-a`-vis unfair competition, whereby the information is
safeguarded from misappropriation in an unauthorized manner. During negotiations, developing
countries did not recognize undisclosed information as an IPR category and were against its
inclusion. They argued that extending protection to this subject matter would push their
obligations beyond patent protection because of the limitless term of protection accorded to
this category and the absence of disclosure tradeoff for protection, unlike patents (Watal, 2001);
but it was included nevertheless. TRIPS underscores the importance of undisclosed protection
by setting it as an IPR category and extending it to include data submitted to governments for
marketing approval of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products.
There are two parts to protecting undisclosed information under the agreement: the gen-
eral need to protect information that is secret and valuable, also known as trade secrets, and
the requirement to protect information disclosed for marketing approval from the government.
Trade secrets is defined as information which was generated from a specific investment, consid-
ered valuable, known to few people in the industry, and where effort has been undertaken to
maintain its secrecy. As for data submitted to governments for marketing approval, the data
has to be undisclosed, the product tested to generate the data uses “new chemical entities”,
and “considerable effort” has to be spent to produce the data. These information are protected
for as long as they are not revealed by the owner or an independent third party.
The implementation of TRIPS Art. 39.2 on trade secrets is likely to be straightforward, since
many have already provided protection for this category. But the differing interpretations and
implementations of Art. 39.3 on data submitted to governments and their respective agencies
could lead to varying treatments of protection of data submitted for marketing approval across
WTO members. Firstly, it is unclear if protection under this IPR category requires “exclusive
rights” protection. If the protection mandates exclusive rights protection, then the common
practice in developing countries of allowing for the sufficiency of establishing bioequivalence for
generic drugs with the original test data would no longer be acceptable for a given time period.
Secondly, the ordinary reading of Art. 39.3 could be interpreted as mandating protection only
to “new chemical entity” implying that new uses of existing chemical product would not be
covered, which can be controversial for some other member countries such as the United States
(Correa, 2002).
to specific expressions of any legal system (Gervais, 2003).
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3.2.3 Copyrights and related rights
The Berne Convention was the highest protection afforded at the international level for copy-
rights before TRIPS. It mandates that all literary and artistic works that meet the originality
and intellectual creation criteria should be protected automatically from the date of creation
without subject to any formalities for the duration of the author’s lifespan plus 50 years. A
separate duration of at least 25 years is extended to works of applied arts and industrial de-
sign, although members are allowed to determine the extent of application and conditions of
this protection. Brazil, for example, protected computer programs as works of applied arts and
thus administered the 25 year protection. More importantly the Berne Convention allows for
broader scope of exceptions to copyright protection and provides flexible implementation obli-
gations to developing countries. A predominant exception practiced by many countries is the
fair use doctrine where use of the copyrighted material is sanctioned in instances of private,
not for profit and educational purposes, i.e. uses that generate positive spillover (Blair and
Cotter, 2005). The appendix to the Berne Convention outlines special provisions applicable
to developing countries. For example, translation of copyrighted materials into the national
language is allowed if it meets the 3-step criteria for limited uses of exceptions to copyright.18
Related rights, also known as neighboring rights, is mainly governed by the Rome Con-
vention. It obliges protection of performers, producers of sound recordings and broadcasting
organization for 20 years from the date of performance, broadcast or fixation without subject
to any formalities. Protection includes the right to control the reproduction of their work. The
Convention, however, did not offer any enforcement provision in case of infringement but most
countries offered civil remedies.
TRIPS combines the rights of copyrights and related rights under one heading, merging
relevant elements of the Berne and Rome Conventions. However, the marginal addition and legal
clarifications of TRIPS provisions on copyrights and related rights, as well as the compliance of
many developing countries with the pre-existing international laws on this subject matter made
this the least controversial IPR category of TRIPS. Nevertheless, there were some opposition
from developing countries in regards to the obligations under rental rights (Art. 11) and related
rights (Art. 14). Art. 11 of TRIPS introduces rental rights protection for computer programs
and sound recordings, which most developing country negotiators considered as a Berne-plus
obligation. Furthermore, Watal (2001) argues that Art. 14 of TRIPS on related rights creates
18The 3-step test used to establish if the instance to avail to copyright exception is: (i) granted in special
cases only; (ii) not conflict with normal exploitation of work; and (iii) not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the author.
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new obligations that are higher than those mandated by Rome Convention but points out that
this was not met with much resistance from several of them as they were already providing such
protection.
3.2.4 Layout designs of integrated circuits
Protection of layout designs of integrated circuits is a relatively new addition to the global
IPR system. The upsurge in United States’ semiconductor companies and export to other
countries gave rise to this protection. At the time of Uruguay Round of negotiations, the
Washington Treaty governed the protection of this IPR category at the global level. However
lack of adequate number of ratification by members of this treaty ensured that the treaty did
not come into force.19 TRIPS remedies this situation by enforcing it as part of the IPR package.
In addition, the Agreement expands the scope of protection to include protected designs and
set the term of protection for a minimum of 8 years from filing date or date of first commercial
exploitation.
Layout designs of integrated circuits protects the configuration of a circuit board, whereby
changes made to the board increases its functionality. These changes oftentimes require high
degree of skills and large amount R&D, thus qualifying it for patent protection in some juris-
dictions.
3.2.5 Industrial designs
Industrial designs protection has been protected under the Paris Convention and is included
as an IPR category. Prior to TRIPS, countries were able to protect industrial designs with
copyright laws, unfair competition or by establishing sui generis legislation on the matter.
Protection in this area is in regards to the aesthetic, and sometimes functional, aspects of any
product that is industrially produced. It can also be protected under copyright laws, thus
obtaining concurrent and simultaneous protection. However unlike copyright, protection under
industrial designs safeguards from independent development of similar design.
TRIPS did not create additional obligations under industrial design protection. It merely
reinforces the common practices and rules of Paris Convention, whereby the term of protection
is for least 10 years.
19Developing countries were actively participating in the negotiations of this treaty, and thus reflected many
of its views. However, the United States and Japan did not sign onto the treaty as it was perceived as providing
inadequate protection level (Gervais, 2003; Watal, 2001).
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3.2.6 Trademark and GI
Trademark and geographical indication (GI) protect consumers from being misinformed about
the products that they are purchasing due to false advertisements or similar appearances. Trade-
mark has been protected under Paris Convention but is only extended to goods and not services.
TRIPS marginally increases the protection level of trademark in both developed and developing
countries. It clearly defines trademark, outlines the treatment of well-known foreign marks, and
provides limited protection for services trademark (Watal, 2001).
GI was protected under Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks20 and
Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registra-
tion21 in regards to appellations of origin. Prior to TRIPS, GI was provided by a few countries
and there was diversity in the protection methods and standards. TRIPS included GI as one
of the IPR categories but left implementation of this particular area to members, with a caveat
that members will continue their negotiations in this matter to define its scope and depth of
protection.
Table E in the Appendix summarizes the seven IPR categories mentioned above. It shows
the definition, term of protection, criteria for protection, rights conferred and the exceptions for
each of the IPR types. In the following section I build the TRIPS index base on the definition
and the term of protection of the IPR categories.
4 TRIPS index: method
TRIPS agreement is broken into eight parts. Part I upholds the basic tenets of the WTO, while
Part II highlights the minimum substantive protection in the different IPR categories. Parts
III and IV outline the various process procedures to be implemented or modified. Part V man-
dates publications of new or modified legislations and that disputes would be conducted under
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) agreement. Part V I sets the transitional
arrangements for developing countries. And finally Part V III describes institutional arrange-
ments and other final details of the agreement. All of these TRIPS provisions are equally binding
but the relevant provisions that pertain to IPR scope and depth of protection are contained in
parts II and III.22
20Hereinafter referred to as the Madrid Treaty.
21Hereinafter referred to as the Lisbon Treaty.
22Every part of this Agreement is technically equally binding. Thus, there is no hierarchy between enforcing ei-
ther Trademark and Undisclosed Information rights. This is referred to as the principle of effective interpretation.
(See Appellate Body Report, WTO (1999).
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I select my sample of developing countries by considering all 76 countries that joined the
WTO on the 1st January 1995 but dropping those that the World Bank classifies as high
income countries23. I omit two of the 44 developing countries remaining due to the difficulty of
obtaining their IPR legislations online. For personal interest and to add diversity to the sample
purposes, I include 11 developing countries that join the WTO in the year 1995 other than the
1st January,24 and three high income countries from the Southeast Asia region.
4.1 Data collection
I focus on the substantive elements of the Agreement to capture institutional changes that would
affect innovative activities and simplify data collection effort. Procedural and administrative
aspects of TRIPS is likely to affect the behaviors of IPR users in regards to time for filing
or challenges to patent, trademark or copyright grants. But they are less likely to affect the
undertaking of innovative activities and thus are not included in the construction of the TRIPS
index. I note that a country is in compliance with the Agreement when the term of protection
for each of the IPR category reflects those mandated by TRIPS. Sub-section 4.2 describes in
detail how the index was constructed.
Data collection of each of the 53 developing member countries are based on careful examina-
tion of primary and secondary sources and in consultation with IPR experts, wherever possible.
Following Lesser (2002), I scour the WTO official documents, which reviews members’ efforts
in implementing TRIPS provisions25 and cross-reference them to the WTO Secretariat docu-
ments on these members’ overall trade policies. These documents, referred to as the TRIPS
Council Legislation Review and Trade Policy Review reports, are reliable sources for members’
legislative changes as they are based on the governments’ own submissions and the Secretariat’s
objective research.26 I note compliance of each IPR category base on whether the legislation
in the reports meet the TRIPS mandated minimum term of protection; a method similar to
Rapp and Rozek (1990). When the minimum term of protection is in concordance with the
Agreement, I save the name of the legislation and consult WIPO’s Collection of Laws for Elec-
tronic Access (CLEA) database for the year that the legislation is implemented.27 I use the
23These countries include those that are members of the OECD and those that are considered non-OECD.
24These countries acceded to the WTO over the course of 1995, and thus are able to use the transition period
for implementation according to their income levels.
25This includes the question and answer portion of the TRIPS Review Mechanism.
26These documents can be retrieved from the WTO site by searching for documents “IP/Q*” and “WTO/TPR”
respectively.
27There are two dates that corresponds to legislation - the implementation and in force date. The implemen-
tation date is usually the date wherein which the legislation is signed and approved, while the in force date refers
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implementation instead of the in force dates of the legislation because this is when everyone
should be aware of the new or modified legislation.28 For most countries the implementation
and in force dates are within the same year except for low income and a few other countries.
In creating the index I make three assumptions. First, I assume that prior to the WTO
inception, 1995, members in the sample were not TRIPS-compliant. Second, I assume that
members would use the transition period afforded by the TRIPS agreement in implementing
their IPR obligations.29 And lastly, I assume that members are not able to implement all
seven IPR categories simultaneously because of various constraints, e.g. budget. Given these
assumptions, I build an index that takes into consideration all seven IPR categories and the
different implementation times for each of those categories for the years 1994 onward.
4.2 Creating the index
Copyright, trademark, geographical indication, industrial designs, patents, layout designs of
integrated circuits and undisclosed information are the seven categories of IPR identified by
TRIPS. I create dummy variables to reflect members’ compliance with the respective terms
of duration per category. I assign 1 to the category, and 0 otherwise, if the IPR legislation
mandates the protection term that is in-line with the Agreement. I create three subsections
for under the headings of patent and copyright and related rights, and two subsections for the
undisclosed information because of the additional demands imposed by the Agreement on these
IPR categories.
The three subsections under the patent heading accommodates the obligation to provide
20 years term of patent protection, including extension of the patent protection to pharmaceu-
tical and agricultural chemical products, and the sui generis plant varieties legislation. Data
collection of dates for implementation of these three patent subsections show time implementa-
tion discrepancies. In comparison to the 36 member countries who currently offer the 20-year
patent protection term, 12 members have different date of implementation for pharmaceutical
and agricultural chemical products, while for plant varieties there are 26 members.
to when the legislation comes into force.
28I assume that all agents would make their decisions on all information available to them during that period.
And thus, even if a legislation may not be in force, the important fact is that the agent expects the legislation to
be in force within a specific time period and thus will base her future actions on the information she has today.
29An additional time period of four years is accorded to countries considered as developing, and ten years for
least-developed countries from the 1st January 1996. The WTO follows the United Nation’s categorization of
least-developed countries (LDCs). However, the status of developing country is based on self-selection. The
Doha Ministerial Conference allowed LDCs a further extension until 1st July 2013 to ensure that complete
TRIPS-compliance.
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Copyright and related rights category in TRIPS refers to the copyright law as protected
under Berne Convention and related rights, which falls under Rome Convention. Given that
most countries were complying with the main Berne Convention provisions, I note TRIPS
compliance when the country meets the additional obligations imposed by the Agreement.
These additional obligations that are not specifically covered in the Berne Convention are
the treatment of computer programs as literary works, inclusion of rental rights and related
rights. These add-ons raise the level of protection on copyrights and related rights and are
important from economic perspectives. Firstly, protecting computer program as literary work
entails longer term of protection. Secondly, rental rights obligations on computer programs and
cinematographic work are important in countries where rampant pirating of these works render
the copyright protection useless (Watal, 2001). And lastly, protection of performers, producers
of phonogram and broadcasting organizations rights ensure adequate legal protection for these
entities. Therefore, I count these add-ons as my three subsections towards compliance under
the copyright and related rights category. Six and seven countries of those that implemented
the treatment of computer programs as literary works have different implementation dates of
rental rights and related rights respectively, confirming that these add-ons should be considered
separately.
I also treat undisclosed information differently from the rest of the IPR categories. Undis-
closed information is broken down into two subsections because of the protection afforded by
TRIPS under this heading. It is defined by TRIPS as information kept secret plus data sub-
mitted to governments and their respective agencies for marketing approval. Comparison of
undisclosed information protection across countries shows differing approaches to the protection
of data submitted to governments for marketing approval. There has not been any expressed
protection of data submitted for marketing approval for most of the developing countries here.
Those countries that did provide for this particular protection allow the use of this data to
establish bioequivalence of a similar product.30 The results show that some 14 odd-countries
out of 37 member countries that do provide TRIPS-compliant trade secret compliance have not
implement data submitted for marketing approval protection until later.
Noting compliance of the remaining IPR categories, trademark, layout designs of integrated
circuits, industrial design and geographical indication are more straightforward than for copy-
rights and related rights, patents and undisclosed information. I consider the remaining cat-
egories as TRIPS-compliant when the term of protection for the category as listed by the
30Interestingly, protection of data submitted for marketing approval of pharmaceutical or agricultural chemicals
was an attempt by the United States negotiators to curb the use of data collected by its pharmaceutical and
chemical industries by generic producers and other competitors.
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IPR Category Total
Copyright and related rights 1
Computer program 13
Rental rights 13
Related rights 13
Trademark 1
Geographical indications 1
Industrial designs 1
Patents 1
Patents 13
Pharmaceutical patents 13
Plant varieties 13
Layout designs of integrated circuits 1
Undisclosed information 1
Trade secrets 12
Data submission 12
Total 7
Table 2: TRIPS index method
Agreement is implemented in the national legislations. As such, compliance occurs only when
(i) the IPR category is as defined by TRIPS is protected for the (ii) minimum term of protection.
Table 2 summarizes how a country’s IPR legislations sum towards its TRIPS-compliance
index number. Each of the seven IPR categories enter the index unweighted, reflecting the equal
importance of each provisions considered under international law and practice.31 This index
ranges from 0 to 7, from non-compliance to full TRIPS compliance. Full compliance, or an index
total of 7, implies that the country has legally met all of the substantial TRIPS obligations,
while 0 connotes that the particular country has not yet undertaken any efforts to comply with
the Agreement. The index thus allows for examination of the TRIPS implementations across
many developing countries over the time studied (1994 — 2007), and to observe any impact of
this obligation on the countries’ economic activities.
31See footnote 22.
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4.3 Some issues
This TRIPS index has several drawbacks that should be taken into consideration when using for
economic analysis. These shortcomings are attributable to the assumptions I make and method
I use in building this legislative-type index.
Firstly, as in the legislation-type approach of building indexes, I construct the index using bi-
nary numbers to represent whether a developing country has satisfied a particular IPR category,
depending on the TRIPS’ minimum term of protection for the category defined. This method
is likely to underestimate the extent of a country’s compliance with a specific category if one of
the two criteria is not satisfied. For example, I would consider a country’s trademark legislation
as not TRIPS-compliant if the country allows for trademark of goods but not services, even if
the country could be mostly compliant with its trademark legislation. It has been proposed
that further granularity per IPR category should be introduced, as I have done for copyright
and related rights, patents and undisclosed information. However, I introduce granularities for
these IPR categories and not the remaining ones because the Agreement imposes additional
demands on these categories.
Secondly, every one of the seven IPR categories enter the TRIPS index unweighted, meaning
that each category has equal importance for this index. Legal interpretation requires that each
IPR category listed in the Agreement are treated equally, that there is no hierarchy in the
implementation of the TRIPS provisions. However, economic rationale argues that protection
of trademark may not be as important or significant as protection of patented innovation, or
vice-versa. However attaching weights to any one of the category could be subjective, like
the index created by Sherwood (1997). A possible option to get around this subjectivity is
to interact each component of the TRIPS index with variables that correspond to economic
activities in the countries. For example, we could weight the services-related IPR categories of
a country by the proportion of the country’s economy attributable to services sector and so on.
In addition, each incremental increase of the index mirrors the country’s implementation
effort with any one of the seven IPR categories, in no particular order. Therefore, the index
may not reflect the strength of the country’s IPR regime, making it difficult to argue that a
country with TRIPS index of 3 is significantly different from another with an index of 4. We
could address this flaw by subdividing the index into three categories of high-, middle- and
low-compliance levels. Countries with a TRIPS index of above 5 can be deemed high-, between
2.1 and 4.9 as middle-, and below 2 as low-levels of compliance.
Another problem associated with the unweighting of the TRIPS index is that we do not know
which IPR category is being implemented at different time periods. For example, a country may
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achieve a TRIPS index of 5, implying high TRIPS compliance, but may neglect to fully comply
with its obligations for patent protection. In this case, access to the disaggregated TRIPS index
would be rectify the problem.
Thirdly, this index considers memberships to other IPR international agreement as irrele-
vant. It can be contended that membership to those agreements, such as Paris Convention,
reflects the country’s willingness to abide by certain agreed rules and regulations and thus
should be taken into consideration. I argue that if membership to those agreements were suffi-
cient, then the need to have another international agreement on IPR, such as TRIPS, would be
redundant. Recall from Section 2 that the TRIPS agreement can be better enforced than older
international IPR agreements, thus making this Agreement “stronger” than its predecessors.
In addition, TRIPS adopts the main elements of some of the more important IPR agreements,
such as Paris and Berne, and thus including membership to the said agreements would be
double-counting.
Lastly, as legislation-type indexes discussed earlier, this index considers TRIPS-compliant
rules and regulations without looking at the enforcement aspect. Enforcement of the IPR
legislation at the national level is dependent on (i) government’s willingness to enforce the
legislation and (ii) the ability of IPR holders, as well as challengers to the IPR granted, to have
recourse to the judicial system, which may include but are not limited to, opposition of patent
grant procedures, legal fees, and the transparency of IPR system, assuming the competence of
the local judicial system in dealing with IPR issues. Furthermore, unlike the indexes built by
Park (Park (2008) and Park and Lippoldt (2007)), I do not include the specificities of local legal
administrative enforcement, such as existence of burden-of-proof reversal in the case of patent
system. However, the Agreement sets the administrative enforcement standards for member
countries and failure to comply with these standards can lead to dispute settlement proceeding.
This allows for the assumption that when a developing country member complies with any of the
IPR categories, it also complies with the administrative aspect of that category. Furthermore,
we can overcome the lack of these enforcement-specific factors by interacting the TRIPS index
with data collected by the USTR, WEF or IMD, or any other data that captures the actual
local enforcement of the IPR system, following the example of Smarzynska Javorcik (2004).
Nevertheless this index still retains the important factors that sets it apart from other
indexes: it is TRIPS-specific, takes into consideration the transition periods accorded to devel-
oping countries, and covers several countries over ten years of annual observation. Furthermore,
the index in its current form is adequate for the purpose of this paper.
I discuss and analyze the results of this compilation of IPR legislations of the 53 countries
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in the following section.
5 Analysis of data collected
I examine and cross-check the IPR legislations, Trade Policy Reports and TRIPS Council Leg-
islation Review documents of 53 countries to build the index necessary for this paper.32 The
sample consists of countries from the European (7%), Asian (21%), African (32%) and Latin
American and Caribbean (40%) continents with varying income levels. Most of the countries in
the sample are upper-middle (36%), lower-middle (34%) and low income countries, while high
income countries only account for 3%. There are seven LDCs among the countries studied,
all from the African continent except for Bangladesh, in Asia. I subdivide the countries by
region and income levels to get a comprehensive picture of the efforts undertaken. The result
of the data collection effort below refer to the legislations in those countries that are in force.
Approximately 12 countries have TRIPS-compliant legislations that were not in force, and so I
omit them from the analysis below.
5.1 Graphical analysis
Three trends appear from the developing countries’ implementation of their TRIPS obligations.
Firstly, almost all countries avail themselves to the transition periods afforded by the Agreement,
and in most cases have exceed the time limit imposed by the transition period, excluding the
LDCs. Mexico, Romania, and South Africa of the developing countries and Coˆte d’Ivoire of
the LDCs are the few that have implemented the TRIPS obligations before their deadline, year
2013. The figures displayed this subsection and in the appendix D show to this effect.
Secondly, implementation efforts of developing countries vary, and not necessarily because
of their income levels. Given the stylized fact that most high income countries have higher IPR
protection than lower income countries (see Section 3), it can be argued that countries with
high income levels should implement TRIPS relatively quickly in comparison to low income
countries. However, snapshots of TRIPS compliance efforts of developing countries for the
years 1995 and 2000, Fig. 1 and 2 respectively, show evidences contrary to this. In 1995,
five developing countries had most of their IPR legislations in compliance with the TRIPS
agreement, categorized by index ≥ 5, (Fig. 1(b)). In 2000 the number of countries with four
of the 27 developing countries highly compliant with the Agreement are low income countries
(Fig. 2(b)). Countries to the left of the red dotted line in Fig. 1(b) and 2(b) are low income
countries. More comprehensively, Fig. 3 the income levels of developing countries studied
32Refer to subsection 4 for explanation of country selection.
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against the years when they became highly TRIPS-compliant (TRIPS index ≥ 5). The figure
shows that most of the developing countries achieve high TRIPS compliance in the year 2000
regardless of their income levels. Examination of the countries’ TRIPS compliance and their
innovative capacities also show that the developing countries’ studied seem obliged to implement
the TRIPS agreement regardless of their countries’ innovative capacities. Fig. 4 plots countries
that have achieved high TRIPS compliance by their innovative capacities proxied by the ArCo
index, computed by Archibugi and Coco (2004). The ArCo index classifies the developing
countries into four categories: leader, potential, latecomers and marginalized, indicating the
levels of these countries’ innovation capacities.
(a) All 53 countries (b) Upper-left hand corner
Figure 1: TRIPS compliance by wealth, 1995
(a) All 53 countries (b) Upper-left hand corner
Figure 2: TRIPS compliance by wealth, 2000
Analysis of the implementation efforts over the years give further support to the fact that
implementation of TRIPS agreement is not entirely related to income levels. Fig. 5 shows
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Figure 3: Countries’ wealth by high TRIPS compliance year
Figure 4: Countries’ innovation capacities by high TRIPS compliance year
the evolution of TRIPS-compliant legislation implemented in these African countries from the
years 1994 until 2007. The two dotted vertical lines in the figure mark the original deadlines for
developing countries and LDCs, 2000 and 2006 respectively.33 South Africa, Morocco and Coˆte
d’Ivoire are the only African countries that have managed to fully become TRIPS-compliant by
the year 2000 deadline, and they are from upper-, lower-middle and low incomes respectively.
When examining the implementation efforts of low income countries in Fig. 6, compliance
does not appear to be completely affected by income level. Furthermore, comparing the efforts
of low income countries and upper-middle income countries of Fig. 6 and 7 show that the
33The new deadline for LDCs is 2013, and 2016 for pharmaceutical and agriculture chemical products.
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implementation efforts are similar, albeit with a particular caveats. An advantage that most
upper-middle income countries have over low-income countries is that they are likely to have
more TRIPS-compliant legislations already in place before the WTO agreement was signed and
comes into force. Nevertheless these figures here show that low income countries exert as much
effort as their richer counterparts in implementing their TRIPS obligations. A possible conjec-
ture explaining this similar implementation effort by these income levels could be attributable
to the difficulty of the richer income countries in restructuring their IPR legislations to maintain
protection their local industries.
Figure 5: TRIPS compliance for African countries, 1994 — 2007
Figure 6: TRIPS compliance for low income countries, 1994 — 2007
And lastly, countries in regional trade agreements (RTAs) include IPR obligations tend to
have their compliant legislations in place sooner than those who are not, as evidenced in Fig.
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Figure 7: TRIPS compliance for upper-middle income countries, 1994 — 2007
Figure 8: TRIPS compliance for countries in RTAs, 1994 — 2007
8. The RTAs in question here are the Andean Community, European Communities, OAPI,
ARIPO and NAFTA. This trend lends support to the argument that engagements in RTAs are
beneficial and could complement progress at the broader multilateral level.
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5.2 Future econometrics analysis
Several notable studies have investigated the impact of IPR regimes on economic activities
using the then-available IPR indexes. The TRIPS index that I produce here can be used to
analyze the impact of the TRIPS agreement on those activities as well. Below I run a simple
Pearson pairwise correlation of the TRIPS index for all 53 developing countries with proxies
of innovative activities. For most of the variables, the Pearson pairwise correlation numbers
are positive and significant, indicating that there may be links between the implementation of
the TRIPS agreement and these activities. Pearson pairwise correlation allows us to see the
relationship, if any, between two variables. The advantages of using this correlation to determine
the association between two variables is that it does not require that the variables under study
to have the same units of measurement and avoids casewise deletion.34
Table 3 shows values of Pearson pairwise correlation of the TRIPS index with the various
indicators of economic activities. The columns show the different correlation models for varying
income levels.35 The columns labeled “All”, “Not high”, “Middle”, “Low” and “LDC” refer to
the various income levels of the 53 developing countries, where “Not high” refer to all developing
countries in the sample that are not classified as high income by the World Bank .
Correlation TRIPS index
ρ All Not high Middle Low LDC36
Net FDI 0.2996* 0.3112* 0.2919* 0.2835* 0.1933
High Technology % 0.2650* 0.2279* 0.1785* 0.0866 0.1965
Royalties payments 0.2889* 0.3861* 0.3458* 0.4424* 0.0243
Royalties receipts 0.2360* 0.2820* 0.2358* 0.4344* -0.0517
Trademark nonresident 0.4857* 0.4102* 0.2855* 0.7517* 0.6053*
Trademark resident 0.3358* 0.3284* 0.2735* 0.3788* 0.7921*
Patent filing at EPO 0.1778* 0.2031* 0.3429* 0.3583* 0.1722
Patent filing at JPO 0.1298* 0.1466* 0.2856* 0.3329* 0.1333
Patent filing at national patent office 0.1492* 0.1783* 0.1573* 0.2004 -0.2449
Triadic patent filing 0.1444* 0.1396* 0.2889* 0.3295* 0.131
Patent filing at USPTO 0.1556* 0.2074* 0.3656* 0.3980* 0.1814
GDP per capita 0.2932* 0.3662* 0.2332* 0.5788* 0.5541*
Chemical (% value added) 0.0264 0.0333 0.1967* 0.0623 -0.1497
Export as % of GDP 0.077 -0.0751 -0.2309* 0.0196 -0.0103
Trade as % of GDP 0.0243 -0.1419* -0.2955* -0.0753 -0.0211
Table 3: TRIPS index correlation table
Examination of Table 3 shows that although there is a positive and significant relationship
34For a detailed comparison of casewise versus pairwise deletion see
http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/stbasic.html#ccasewise
35Note that in the WTO developing country term is politically motivated, however for this paper I refer
developing countries as those not considered high income countries, whether in the OECD group or not.
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between the TRIPS index and national income per capita, the relationship is not very strong for
each of the income categories, with correlation varying from 29% to 58%. This simple association
test concur with our graphical analysis that the implementation of the TRIPS-compliant regime
is not necessarily dependent on the countries’ economic development levels.
Across all income levels there are positive and significant relationships between the index
and FDI, both royalty payments and receipts, trademark, and patent filings at the EPO, JPO
and USPTO. Interestingly patent filing at the national patent office is positive and significant
for models all income levels except for low income countries. In addition trade is negatively
correlated with the TRIPS index for countries not falling under the high income classification,
showing that as the IPR regime becomes more TRIPS-compliant the net trade moves in the
opposite direction. For middle income countries there is a negative relationship with export
as a percentage of national income. These simple correlations merit further examination of
the relationship between these values and the TRIPS index to determine if there is a causality
affect, which will be undertaken in future research papers.
6 Conclusion
This paper attempts to build a TRIPS-specific IPR index to study the impact of the TRIPS
agreement for developing WTO member countries. I make three assumptions: (i) prior to the
WTO inception, 1995, members in the sample were not TRIPS-compliant; (ii) members would
use the transition period afforded by the TRIPS agreement in implementing their IPR obliga-
tions; and (iii) members are not be able to implement all seven IPR categories simultaneously
because of various constraints. These assumptions help me construct the TRIPS index by
considering all seven IPR categories separately, narrowing the legislation search to the periods
after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, and refrain from using the transition
deadlines as the actual date of full TRIPS compliance. In addition, the assumption would later
allow me to conduct a natural experiment in investigating the impact of the Agreement on
various economic activities of the countries studied.
Analysis of the data shows three implementation trends. Firstly, almost all developing
countries take advantage of the transition periods clause of the Agreement (Art. 65), and in
some cases exceed the TRIPS implementation deadline for developing countries, 2000. Secondly,
implementation efforts of developing countries vary, and not necessarily because of their income
levels. Lastly, countries in regional trade agreements (RTAs) that include IPR obligations tend
to comply with TRIPS earlier than the rest. The results confirm that the TRIPS agreement
leads to a convergence of global IPR protection across countries. It also makes the case that
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the Agreement’s implementation is an external factor, not entirely influenced by the country’s
level of economic development.
The lack of endogenous attribution of IPR level to economic development and convergence
of global IPR across countries lead to the possibility of using this index as a natural experiment
to understand how IPR influences economic activities and behaviors. This TRIPS index will
be used in future research studies to examine the impact of the Agreement on local economic
activities. An interesting case to study would be to examine how the implementation of this
Agreement affect countries with low- and middle-range technological capacities vis-a`-vis access
to new technology and potential for local innovation to name a few.
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A Countries in the sample
*denotes an LDC
Code Latin America & Caribbean Code Africa & Middle East
ARG Argentina CIV Coˆte d’Ivoire
BLZ Belize EGY Egypt
BOL Bolivia GAB Gabon
BRA Brazil GHA Ghana
CHL Chile KEN Kenya
COL Colombia MAR Morocco
CRI Costa Rica MDG Madagascar*
DMA Dominica MUS Mauritius
GTM Guatemala MWI Malawi*
GUY Guyana NAM Namibia
HND Honduras NGA Nigeria
JAM Jamaica SEN Senegal*
LCA Saint Lucia SWZ Swaziland
MEX Mexico TZA Tanzania*
NIC Nicaragua UGA Uganda*
PER Peru ZAF South Africa
PRY Paraguay ZMB Zambia*
SUR Surinam
URY Uruguay
VCT Saint Vincent & the Grenadines
VEN Venezuela
Code Asia Code Europe
BGD Bangladesh* POL Poland
HKG Hong Kong ROM Romania
IDN Indonesia SVK Slovak Republic
IND India TUR Turkey
KOR South Korea
LKA Sri Lanka
MYS Malaysia
PAK Pakistan
PHL Philippines
SGP Singapore
THA Thailand
A–1
B Regional trade agreements
Andean Community
Bolivia Columbia Ecuador
Peru Venezuela
OAPI
Cameroon Cte d’Ivoire Gabon
Guinea Guinea Equatorial Mali
Mauritania Senegal Chad
ARIPO1
Botswana Gambia Ghana
Kenya Lesotho Malawi
Mozambique Sierra Leone Sudan
Swaziland Tanzania Uganda
Zambia Zimbabwe
EC
Poland Romania Slovak Republic
Turkey2
NAFTA
Mexico
1An intergovernmental organization that cooperates in industrial property matters.
2Bilateral with EC, with the intention of eventually joining when possible.
B–1
C Summary of the variables
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max Source
TRIPS index 742 3.636343 2.873804 0 7 Computed
Net FDI as % of GDP 613 1.60E+09 3.80E+09 -1.17E+10 3.05E+10 WDI
High Technology % 564 10.80869 15.79071 0.0003458 74.9573 WDI
Royalties payments 559 2.94E+08 8.51E+08 -100000 8.65E+09 WDI
Royalties receipts 532 3.99E+07 1.51E+08 0 1.86E+09 WDI
Trademark nonresident 221 5938.566 5786.889 124 21147 WDI
Trademark resident 223 12921.84 19958.39 8 92368 WDI
Patent filing at EPO1 568 77.26408 331.8688 0 4326 PATSTAT
Patent filing at JPO2 568 100.6743 571.3816 0 5650 PATSTAT
Patent filing at NPO3 393 4288.687 15471.58 1 145955 PATSTAT
Triadic patent filing 568 39.66549 189.0346 0 2204 PATSTAT
Patent filing at USPTO4 568 219.2377 1172.785 0 15561 PATSTAT
GDP per capita 636 3218.984 4666.643 118.8362 27372.1 WDI
Chemical (% value added) 325 9.145821 5.902041 0.0069126 49.71656 WDI
Export as % of GDP 628 40.16805 30.56647 7.121518 243.0322 WDI
Trade as % of GDP 628 84.67828 58.88149 16.29955 456.0878 WDI
1European Patent Office
2Japanese Patent Office
3National Patent Office
4United States of America Patent Office
C–1
D Graphical compliance of countries by region and income level
Figure 9: TRIPS compliance for European countries, 1994 — 2007
Figure 10: TRIPS compliance for Latin American and Caribbean countries, 1994 — 2007
Figure 11: TRIPS compliance for Asian countries, 1994 — 2007
D–1
Figure 12: TRIPS compliance for lower-middle income countries, 1994 — 2007
D–2
E TRIPS Provision Overview
IPR General denition Term of protection Criteria for protection Rights conferred Exceptions
Copyright and
related rights
Copyright and related rights are
rights provided to expressions and
includes every production in the
literary, scientic and artistic
domainregardless of the form or
mode of expression or whether they
were published or not (Berne
Art. 2.1). It also extends to computer
programs well as compilations of data
or other materials (Art. 10.1 &
Art. 10.2). But excludes from
protection ideas, procedures, methods
of operation and mathematical
concepts (Art. 9.2).
For expressions: (i) authors life plus
50 years (Berne Art. 7.1); or (ii) 50
years from year of authorized
publication; or (iii) 50 years from
year of making (if no authorized
publication) (Art. 12).
For performers and producers of
phonograms: at least 50 years from
when performance was made
(Art. 14.4).
For broadcasting organizations at
least 20 years from year of broadcast
(Art. 14.4).
To qualify for copyright protection,
the work must by reasons of the
selection and arrangement of their
contentsaltogether form an
intellectual creation (Berne
Art. 2(5)). In practice, the level of
originality requirement varies from
country to country.
Right to exclude unauthorized
reproduction or distributions of
copyrighted work and its derivatives
(Berne Art. 6.1, 8, 11 and 12 and
TRIPS Art. 14.2).
Use for public interest allows some
unauthorized copying for limited
purposes (e.g. education, research).
This is also known as the fair use
doctrine in common law countries.
Art. 9(2) of Berne sets out 3-step
analysis to evaluate consistency of
exception: (i) granted in special case
only; (ii) not conict with normal
exploitation of work; and (iii) not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interest of the author. This provision
is in conformity with TRIPS Art. 13.
Trademark
Trademark is any sign, or
combinations of signsthat would
distinguish the specic goods or
services from another goods or
services (TRIPS Art. 15.1).
More than 7 years of protection from
initial registration and each renewal
of registration. Indenite renewal of
trademark registration required
(TRIPS Art. 18).
Distinctiveness of sign, otherwise
distinctiveness may be acquired
through use (TRIPS Art. 15.1).
Possible to require that the signs be
visually perceptible(TRIPS
Art. 15.1); or that (ii) registrability
dependent on use but (actual) use
cannot be a condition for ling an
application for registration (TRIPS
Art. 15.3).
Right to prevent use by all third
parties of signs that are similar or
identical to the trademarked sign for
goods or services so as to avoid
confusion (TRIPS Art. 16.1). This
right also extends to prevention of
using the trademarked sign for goods
or services that are not those which
the sign is usually associated with,
other than the rightful holder of the
sign (TRIPS Art. 16.3).
Public interest use allowed (e.g. fair
use and prior users rights) as long as
it meets the 3-step criteria set out in
copyrights protection.
Compulsory licensing not permitted
(TRIPS Art. 21).
Geographical
indications
Geographical indications are
indications which identify a good as
originating in the territory of a
Member, or a region or locality in
that territory, where a given quality,
reputation or other characteristic of
the good is essentially attributable to
its geographical origin Art. 22.1).
Additional protection is extended for
wines and spirits (Art. 23).
GI protection is conferred to goods
that have distinctive traits identifying
the good to a specied geographical
area.
Prevention of: (a) the use of any
means in the designation or
presentation of a good that indicates
or suggests that the good in question
originates in a geographical area
other than the true place of origin in
a manner which misleads the public
as to the geographical origin of the
good;and (b) any use which
constitutes an act of unfair
competition within the meaning of
Article 10bis of the Paris Convention
(1967)(Art. 22.2).
Generic names are exlucdable from
protection.
GI of services are not included.
E1
IPR General denition Term of protection Criteria for protection Rights conferred Exceptions
Industrial design
Not dened in TRIPS per se, but
protection for textile designs are
specically underscored in Art. 25.2.
Protection is usually granted for the
ornamental, aesthetic and functional
(optional) aspects of an industrial
product.
Depends: (i) if protected under
industrial design sui generis regime,
then at least 10 years of protection
awarded (Art. 26.3); or
(ii) if under copyright regime, then
protection at least 50 years post
mortem auctoris; or
1.5[ex] (iii) if under sui generis design
law and copyright, then duration of
protection is at least 25 years.
New or original and independently
created. Possible to exclude design
from protection if the said design is
not signicantly di¤erent from
known designs or combinations of
known design features(Art. 25.1).
Possible to refuse protection for
designs dictated essentially by
technical or functional
considerations(Art. 25.1).
Prevention of making, selling or
importing articles bearing or
embodying a design which is a copy,
or substantially a copy of the
protected designby third parties,
especially for commercial purposes
(Art. 26.1).
Depends on the protection regime
chosen. Copyright and unregistered
sui generis regimes deliberate copying
is prevented but independent
development of design is permitted.
Under registered sui generis regime,
both deliberate copying and
independent development of design is
prohibited.
Allowed as long as the exceptions: (i)
do not unreasonably conict with
the normal exploitation of protected
industrial designs,(ii) do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the owner of the
protected designand (iii) interests
of third parties are taken into
consideration (Art. 26.2).
Patents
Patent is a protection granted to new
process or product inventions,
regardless of the technology eld. In
exchange for the patent protection,
the patent applicant has to disclose
the invention in a manner that is
su¢ ciently clear and completefor a
skilled person to carry out (Art. 29.1
20 years from the ling date; if no
original grant system then date is
computed from the ling date in the
system of original grant (Art. 33).
(i) New
(ii) Involve inventive step
(iii) Capable of industrial application
An exclusive right conferred to patent
holder to prevent third parties from
using, making, selling or distributing
the patented products or products
made from the patented process
(Art. 28.1). Rights holder can assign
or transfer the patented product or
process to another holder, and even
to conclude licensing contract
(Art. 28.2).
Members may exclude from
patentability inventions that (i)
would have a negative impact on
society, i.e. for ordre public or
morality reasons; (ii) certain subject
matters such as methods for the
treatments of humans or animals,
plants and animals that have not had
any human interventions (Art. 27.3).
Several conditions have to be met if
using patented invention without the
approval of the rights holder either
for research purposes or compulsory
licensing (see TRIPS Art. 30 and 31
respectively).
Transition periods available for: (i)
developing, LDCs and transitional
economies; (ii) countries with no
product patenting for pharmaceutical
and agrochemical products.
Layout designs of
integrated circuits
Protection o¤ered to IC (chipsin
IT industry) as well as the
layout-design of the IC, whereby the
IC is in and/or on a piece of material
intended to perform and electronic
function and the layout-design of the
IC is of three dimensional form that
is intended for manufacture
(Washignton, Art 2(i) and 2(ii)).
At least 10 years from date of ling
an application for registration or from
rst commercial exploitation
(regardless of where rst exploitation
took place) (Art. 38.1 and Art. 38.2).
Protection may be limited to not
exceed 15 years after the creation of
the layout design (Art. 38.3).
Possible to protect using sui generis,
copyrights or patents. Terms of
protection thus depends on either one
of the categories listed.
Original in the sense that the layout
designs are the result of their
creatorsown intellectual e¤ort and
are not commonplace among creators
of layout designs and manufacturers
of IC at the time of their creation"
(Washington Treaty Art. 3.2(a)).
Protection prevents third parties
from importing, selling or otherwise
distributing for commercial purposes
a protected layout-design, an IC in
which a protected layout-design is
incorporated, or an article
incorporating such IC only in so far
as it continues to contain an
unlawfully reproduced layout-design
(Art. 36). Does not protect the
layout-designs functionality.
Exceptions for use without
authorization of rights holder are the
same as applied for patents
(Art. 37.2). Also, exceptions provided
for those creations that were
independently created (Washington
Art. 6.2(c)).
Compulsory licensing only allowed for
(i) anti-competitive grounds; and (ii)
for use by government for
non-commercial purposes.
E2
IPR General denition Term of protection Criteria for protection Rights conferred Exceptions
Undisclosed
information
Dened as information that: (a) not
generally known or readily accessible
to the circle of people who normally
deal with the matter in its precise
conguration and assembly of its
component; (b) has commercial value
because it is secret; and (c)
reasonable e¤ort has been undertaken
to keep the information secret
(Art. 39.2). Protection for data
submitted for marketing approval of
pharmaceutical or agricultural
chemical products is highlighted and
kept separate from the general
treatment of undisclosed
information.
Protection lasts as long as
information is kept secret, unless an
independent discover publishes the
secret.
Silent on duration of term of
protection on data submitted for
marketing approval of pharmaceutical
and agricultural chemical products.
Any information that has commercial
value because it is secret and actions
have been taken to ensure its
condentiality, beyond the key
personnel who usually deal with the
matter.
When data is required to approve
marketing of pharmaceutical or
agricltural chemical products, which
utilize new chemical entitiesthat
involved considerable e¤ortto
obtain and is not publicly known,
then data submitted should be
protected against unfair commercial
use (Art. 39.3).
Protection against unlawful
disclosure, acquisition and use by
third parties in manner contrary to
honest commercial practice.
None listed under TRIPS provisions.
But di¤ering interpretations of
TRIPS Art. 39.3 in developed
countries have led to di¤ering practice
of allowing use of original data
submitted for marketing approval of
pharmaceutical and agircultural
chemical products to approve generic
products (e.g. to prove
bioequivalence without having to
duplicate test data for generic drugs).
3
